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This dissertation aims to explore how the different commitments of allies in 
war coalitions affect bilateral trade relationships. According to the framework 
of security externality, allies are assumed to be reliable partners committed to 
the common interest, as opposed to non-allies. However, allies may not be 
reliable partners. Alliances differ in their contributions; some are more 
cooperative with certain trading partners than others. Therefore, literature thus 
far on the relationship between alliance and trade has been limited because they 
uniformly categorize allies with little regard to their behavioral differences. In 
order to analyze the effects of alliances on commerce, behavioral patterns 
within the alliance group and their impacts on trade need to be considered as 
well. 
In a bilateral trade relationship among allies, states no longer decide 
upon trade relations on the basis of the fear that trading partners may increase 
their military power through the gains from trade. Instead, the state strategically 
uses trade as a foreign policy tool in order to induce behavioral changes in 
allies and to evaluate their performances. Therefore, I argue that when a 
bilateral trade relationship is formed, the state scrutinizes not only the fact that 





This paper observes the relationship between allies’ different behaviors 
and trade flows by inquiring into the Vietnam War coalition. The United States 
as a coalition leader promoted participation and contribution by discriminately 
handing out trade benefits to potential participants. As a result, the behavior of 
allies in terms of their participation and contribution are most clearly 
diversified in the case of the Vietnam War. Based on this, I derive the following 
hypothesis: allies that contribute more to coalitions are more likely to be 
rewarded with trade benefits by the coalition leader.  
 To measure trade benefits what the United States offered to its allies 
that joined in the coalition, this study investigates bilateral trade flows in textile 
and apparels. I conduct both statistical analysis using the system Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) and case study comparing South Korea and 
Taiwan in order to test the hypothesis. The results of this study show that allies’ 
different behaviors in the Vietnam War coalition have significant and large 
effect on textile trade flows. The finding suggests that coalition leaders 
discriminate allies’ performances by giving more trade benefits to countries 
who contribute the most to the war coalition. 
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1.1 Rewards of Cooperation 
A number of studies have argued that political-military alliances affect 
international trade. (Gowa and Mansfield 1993; Dixon and Moon 1993; Gowa 
1995; Mansfield et al, 2000; Morrow et al 1998, 652). Allies trade more with 
one-another than non-allies because the gains from trade can be used to 
enhance the potential military power of both allies and adversaries. Due to the 
fear that the adversary might take advantage of trade benefits in order to build 
up military strength, states raise trade barriers towards adversaries (Mansfield 
et al 2000, 305). On the contrary, allies can increase the military capability of 
the entire alliance group through an active bilateral economic exchange (Long 
and Leeds 2006, 434). Trade produces positive security externalities between 
allies and negative security externalities between enemies (Gowa and 
Mansfield 1993, 411). Therefore, when states build a bilateral trade relationship, 
they most importantly distinguish between friends and foes, selectively 
developing trade relationships only with friends. This suggests that one of the 




trading partner is a friend or enemy.  
 However, another factor that can influence international trade as much 
as the criteria between friend and foe is the following question: ‘what kind of 
friend are you?’ Support is likely to be expected once alliances are formed 
(Morrow 1994, 271), but allies are not always faithful to their duties as a friend 
(Leeds et al 2000; Fortna 2003, 342; Leeds 2003, 809; Gartzke and Gleditsch 
2004). Even during the Cold War where the distinction between friend and 
enemy was most clear, the member states of each camp did not behave as 
expected. Although President Reagan famously said, "Here is my strategy on 
the Cold War: we win, they lose," those states belonging to ‘we’ did not always 
fight and struggle in unity to preserve security and common defense. It is 
possible that allies might be unpredictable partners (Gartzke and Gleditsch 
2004, 777). In spite of having developed strong trade relationships upon the 
perception of others as ‘friends’, they may be of little to no assistance in times 
of need, and others that were considered to be less closer ‘friends’ can turn out 
to be strong supporters that provide actual assistance.  
 Trade flows are primarily influenced by the ally- non-ally distinction, 
but when paying attention only to trade relations with allies, the symbolic 
meaning of the alliance is no longer important. This is because states do not 
decide upon trade relations on the basis of the fear that their trading partners 




differentiate relations with ally states based on how cooperative a friend these 
allies were to them. If “trade indeed follows the flag” (Pollins 1989a, 546), then 
how does trade flow within the same flag? In order to fully understand the 
effects of alliances on international trade, it is important to examine how allies 
build and manage their own trade relations. Thus, this paper seeks to 
understand international trade flows within the alliance group with a focus on 
intra-alliance behaviors.  
 
1.2. Research Question and Arguments 
How do different behaviors of states within an alliance group affect bilateral 
trade relationships? I argue that when a bilateral trade relationship is formed, 
the state scrutinizes not only the fact that the trading partner is an ally, but also 
the behavior of the allies as well. Trade with allies still produces positive 
security externalities associated with each other’s' rising wealth and military 
power compared to trade with enemies. However, this does not imply that all 
bilateral trade relationships are strong because it is difficult to assume that allies 
will always be cooperative and strongly committed to other ally partners. 
Amongst allied states, the trade relationship is stronger and deeper in 
proportion to the degree of political or military compliance. In an intra-alliance 
bilateral trade relationship, states put a strong emphasis on how cooperative 




Carnegie 2014; Davis et al 2017, 4). 
 More specifically, this study focuses on states' roles as active players 
that use trade as a foreign policy tool (Davis et al 2017, 2). If there is a clear 
distinction between friend and enemy, trade patterns are almost automatically 
determined by traditional security concerns, the desire to reward friends and 
punish adversaries (Pollins 1989a, 470). However, without the dichotomous 
distinctions of friend and enemy, trade can be an instrument of foreign policy to 
reward cooperative friends and punish recalcitrant ones. Rather than let 
political and security tensions decide a state's foreign trade policy, states 
actively employ trade policies to induce behavioral changes in allies and to 
evaluate their performances. This is a feature of economic statecraft in that the 
state pursues foreign policy goals using its economic power and influence in an 
asymmetrical trade relationship (Hirschman [1945] 1980; Baldwin 1985; Lake 
2009). This paper examines how states discriminate allies' performances using 
their economically advantageous bargaining positions and how these 
evaluations are reflected in bilateral trade relationships.  
 In war coalitions where two or more states jointly perform military 
actions, a coalition leader seeks participation and contributions from its allies. 
However, war coalitions require allies to take greater risks and higher costs than 
most other events that require cooperation from allies such as voting alignment 




participation demands a high-level commitment from allies, behavioral patterns 
of allies regarding the war coalition are very much diversified. States that were 
initially expected to be cooperative towards the coalition may end up not 
participating, and those that were not expected to cooperate might participate in 
the coalition. Moreover, those countries that are expected to contribute more 
resources might wound up adhering to the lowest standards, and states that 
were expected to contribute proportionally to their capabilities may end up 
exceeding expectations by making the fullest commitments. The coalition 
leader strategically uses trade as a foreign policy tool in order to differentiate 
varying degrees of allies’ behaviors in war coalitions. I argue that varying 
degrees of participation and levels of contribution by the allies in the war 
coalition lead to trade discrimination because only the supporters are rewarded 
with great trade benefits by the coalition leader. 
 
1.3 Research Methods 
I observe the relationship between allies’ different behaviors and trade flows by 
inquiring into the Vietnam War coalition. The Vietnam War is a case in which 
the United States sought significant assistance from its allies as the coalition 
leader. However, the military compliance of U.S. allies varies in participation 
and contribution. I utilize both statistical analysis and a comparative case study 




benefits to its allies based on their different levels of contribution to the 
Vietnam War coalition.  
  First, I systematically find out whether allies that contributed more to 
coalitions were rewarded with higher textile trade volumes by the United States 
from 1962 to 1975. I divide the difference in behavior of the U.S.’s allies and 
like-minded states into three groups: ‘no participation’, ‘low contribution’ and 
‘high contribution’. To measure trade benefits, this study focus on the textile 
trade flows, as the textile and apparel industry was one of the leading export 
products for both European and Asian countries in the 1960s and the 1970s. I 
apply the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation to 
capture dynamic effects of trade flows. 
 For an in-depth understanding of the relationship between alliance 
behaviors and international trade flow, this paper focuses on two important 
cases as points of analysis: South Korea and Taiwan. South Korea and Taiwan 
were common in their levels of economic development, national capabilities, 
the relationship with the United States during the Cold War, and the importance 
of the textile industry in domestic economic growth. However, South Korea and 
Taiwan responded differently to the U.S.’s request to join the coalition. South 
Korea participated to the coalition with the highest level of contributions by 
sending the largest foreign troops after the United States. On the other hand, 




transported soldiers during wartime instead of deploying their own combat 
soldiers into the Vietnam War. I analyze the foreign policy making process of 
the United States and compares trade negotiations with South Korea and that of 
Taiwan regarding larger quotas for textile and apparel products. 
 
1.4 Outline 
The paper proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the relevant 
literature. It clarifies theoretical frameworks to explain how military alliances 
affect international trade. This chapter can be divided into three parts. First, I 
define the war coalition and explain why the burden sharing of war coalitions is 
mainly distributed to the coalition leader. Next, I specify different behavioral 
patterns of ally states in war coalitions by their varying levels of participation 
and contribution. While earlier studies on security externality examine the 
differences in the trade relationship between allies and non-allies, I expand the 
spectrum of state behaviors to find out how behavioral patterns within the 
alliance group impact on bilateral trade relationship. Lastly, chapter 2 explains 
how state strategically uses trade as a foreign policy to differentiate varying 
behaviors of the alliance.  
 Chapter 3 introduces the research design of this paper. I specifically 
focus on the case of the Vietnam War as the war coalition during the Vietnam 




allies when compared to other U.S.-led war coalitions. Also, I measure trade 
benefits using bilateral trade flows in textile and apparels. Textile and apparel 
products were one of the main export products for the U.S. alliances during the 
Cold War, so I argue that the United States rewarded its allies proportionately 
according to the degree of cooperation in war. 
 Chapter 4 tests the hypothesis using statistical analysis. I present data 
and variables of this study and provide a description of textile trade flows over 
time from 1962 to 1975 by the degree of allies' participation and contribution. I 
then explain the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). This study 
includes lagged dependent variables as the current trade flows are determined 
by its previous level. I show that different behavioral responses to the Vietnam 
War by the U.S.’s allies, as in the varying degrees of participation and levels of 
contribution, led to proportionately different changes in textile trade volume. 
 Chapter 5 tests the hypothesis using a comparative case study between 
South Korea and Taiwan. I first examine similarities of these states in three 
parts: national capabilities, the military relationship with the United States, and 
the importance of the textile industry in their economic growth. Next, I present 
how South Korea and Taiwan were different in their contributions to the 
Vietnam War coalition. By conducting archival research, I focus on whether 
there were solid textile negotiations between the United States and these two 




who showed the highest levels of contribution. 
 In conclusion, I summarized the arguments and the main findings 
forwarded in this paper. I highlight that the United States discriminates allies' 
performances by giving more trade benefits to countries who contribute the 









2.1 Collective Action Problem in War Coalitions 
A war coalition is a form of collective military action where two or more states 
jointly make a threat to use force against their common enemy (Weitsman 2003, 
82; Wolford 2015, 12-3). Alliance studies have been the theoretical foundation 
for war coalitions, as the two concepts of coalitions and alliances share a 
fundamental characteristic. As a form of military cooperation, both alliances 
and war coalitions advance the mutual interest of states in the deterrence of a 
common threat through the aggregation of capabilities (Morrow 1991, 907; 
Snyder 2007, 59). However, unlike a formal military alliance, which binds 
committed countries through a legal agreement and treaty, a war coalition 
comprises ‘like-minded states’ to conduct joint military operations, involving 
both allies and non-allied partners (Tago 2006, 180). Also, a formal alliance 
persists and obligates partners’ commitments to their allies as long as the threat 
remains (Morrow 1994), but a war coalition is a rather temporary event which 
mobilizes military cooperation of states in response to an immediate crisis 




 In the war coalition, the common burden and cost come to be shared in 
a disproportionate way among participants. Burden sharing of war coalitions is 
mainly distributed to the larger and stronger states while relatively smaller 
states barely share the cost of collective defense. Figure 1 shows unequal 
burden sharing tendencies in 14 interstate wars where multi-national coalitions 
were present. I measured the sharing of burdens using the number of troops sent 
from each state out of the total number of foreign troops in the coalition and 
their national material capabilities from the NMC dataset. The dark color of 
each bar graph indicates the amount of burden sharing that the strongest state 
bears and the rest of the graph represents the shares of remaining coalition 
partners. In twelve cases, the strongest state of the coalition shoulders more 
than half of the burden. Especially, wars involving the United States, such as 
the Korean War (1950-1953), the Vietnam War (1955-1975), the Gulf War 
(1998-1999), the Afghanistan War (2001-2004), and the Iraq War (2003-2011), 
show that US soldiers comprised 80% of all foreign troops.1 This suggests that 
the burden of the coalition depends on the relative power positions of states 
(Tago 2006, 180).  
This disproportionate share of the burden is mostly due to the respons- 
                                                          
1
 The reason why the burden sharing of the US recorded a low of 60% during the Kosovo 
War is because NATO, which consists of a number of European states, was the main 
participant in the war. Thus, a several European states with high stakes in the Kosovo War 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































bility of the strongest states (Oneal 1990, 427; Sandler and Hartley 2001; 875). 
As coalition leaders, they normally have a critical interest in the given war and 
possess the capability to contribute a greater proportion of their resources. The 
benefits of successful deterrence attributable to coalition leaders are public 
goods in that certain non-participatory states also automatically benefit from the 
deterrence as well (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966, 267). Thus, states other than 
the coalition leader and the countries directly involved in the war have the 
incentive to free ride by evading responsibilities for achieving the collective 
objective (ibid, 266). Alliance behavior regarding the war coalition is 
fundamentally a collective action problem (Olson 1965). In order to partially 
reduce the costs and to politically justify its decision to wage war, the coalition 
leader prefers high levels of participation and contribution from allies and other 
like-minded states.  
 
2.2 Allies’ Contribution in War Coalitions 
In building a war coalition, a coalition leader tries to attract potential partners 
with promises of economic incentives which come in a variety of forms. States 
entering into a coalition seek ‘side-payments’ such as territorial concessions, 
economic assistance, or political support to build their own legitimacy (Russett 
1971, 263). Newham (2008) examines economic linkage in the formation of the 




US-led multi-national forces in which more than 60 countries joined. He argues 
that economic inducement played an important role in building the coalition 
given that most of the participants were small, poor and without geopolitical 
stakes in the war. As these countries’ economies were heavily dependent on the 
United States, the Bush administration found that using economic instruments 
to influence them was an efficient means to building a coalition. Newham 
reveals that participatory governments that provided political and military 
support in the Iraq War coalition were offered economic and military aids, trade 
benefits, investment incentives, and preferential bidding on reconstruction 
contracts. Wolford (2015) explores the possibility of using economic incentives 
as a foreign policy tool to encourage and secure the cooperation of partners 
who do not share its interests with the coalition leader, showing that 
compensation has a critical effect on coalition formation and its durability.  
Even if there are economic incentives for joining a coalition, it is 
difficult to ensure participatory states' full commitment. Previous studies have 
raised the point that allies may not be reliable partners (Leeds et al. 2000; Leeds 
2003; Gartzke and Gleditsch 2004). In forming a coalition, the coalition leader 
pre-examines which countries will or will not participate. However, those 
expected by the coalition leader to participate might decide not to as well. 
Furthermore, there is no guarantee of complete dedication by potential partners. 




same side in the war. But they are certainly distinguishable in their differing 
levels of commitment. Some decide to send their troops into war inspite of 
possible exposure to casualties and risk, while other choose to avoid direct 
participation in the war. For instance, some member-states of the coalition 
provide military supplies such as weapons and bases or financial support. 
 Or, as in the case of the Iraq War coalition where the United States was 
willing to make the coalition appear as large as possible, states with minimum 
contributions in the form of verbal and political support were regarded as 
members of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ (Newham 2008, 185). Likewise, 
states differ in their contributions; some are more cooperative with the coalition 
leader than others, and an individual state’s behavior varies according to 
different situations. As the war continues, inconsistency in states' behaviors 
tends to increase. Behaviors of potential partners vary not only in participation, 
but also with the level of contribution. 
 There is a huge difference in participation and the levels of 
contribution among potential partners, so treating their different levels of 
commitment without further discrimination may lead to a partial understanding 
of the role of the economic factor in shaping and sustaining the coalition. Then, 
is it possible to observe coalition leaders distributing differential economic 
incentives to participatory states according to their varying levels of 




participants and non-participants? While earlier research has explored the cost 
of cooperation by looking into the act of participation the military coalition, this 
study tries to specify different behavioral patterns of states and examine the 
impact of varying levels of contribution on economic benefits. Among various 
types of economic incentives, I specifically focus on international trade benefits 
as the form of compensation.  
 
2.3 Military Alliance and International Trade 
Earlier studies have shown that military alliances affect international trade. 
Active trade exchange provides both trading states with economic wealth 
(Gowa 1994; Gowa and Mansfiled 1993, 2004, 781; Kastner 2007). If one state 
decides to invest the gains from trade into augmenting its military capability, it 
can be a substantial threat to other trading partners (Morrow et al. 1998, 652). 
As a result, trade among enemies creates a negative security externality (Gowa 
1995; Long and Leeds, 2006). Trade among allies, on the other hand, produces 
a positive security externality because military spending by alliances leads to 
enhanced security for other allies. The fear that adversaries might exploit trade 
benefits for military uses leads them to foster trade preferably with allies than 
non-allies. Likewise, “trade can be addressed in the relation-specific context” 




 According to the framework of security externality, allies are assumed 
to be reliable partners committed to the common interest, as opposed to non-
allies. However, it is difficult to assume that allies will always be cooperative 
and strongly committed to other ally partners. As such, there is somewhat of a 
difficulty in uniformly categorizing the varying behaviors of alliances as the 
previous research has shown. More specifically, state behavior in response to 
war coalitions can be divided into a two-by-two matrix by alliance and 
cooperation as shown in Figure 2. However, the literature on security 
externality examines the differences in trade between allies and non-allies, 
failing to allow for a comparison between group 2 and group 3: the variations in 
trade within an alliance based on their behaviors. In order to analyze the effects 




of alliances on commerce, behavioral patterns within the alliance group and 
their impacts on trade need to be considered as well.  
 
2.4 Trade as a Foreign Policy Tool 
What kinds of trade policies can states administer towards their allies? Since 
the ally - non-ally distinction is not applicable in this framework, the state no 
longer decides upon trade relations on the basis of the fear that trading partners 
may increase their military power through the gains from trade. Instead, the 
state can be depicted as an active player in the sense that it evaluates the 
behaviors of allies and makes use of rewards and punishments as a means to 
induce their behavioral changes (Pollins 1989a, 83; Pollins 1989b, 739-41; 
Lake 2009). Thus, the state strategically uses trade as a foreign policy tool in 
order to differentiate varying behaviors of the alliance (Davis et al. 2017, 2-7). 
 The existing research centers on how states administer trade policies as 
a means to coerce political compliance upon its trading partners. The relatively 
stronger state in a bilateral trade relationship is likely to have more bargaining 
power (Holsti 1978, 521; Baldwin 1980, 96; Lake 2009). Thus, this state 
utilizes trade as a foreign policy tool by rewarding or punishing partners in 
order to elicit their compliance (Davis at el. 2017, 1). This is a feature of 
economic statecraft in that larger states in an asymmetric alliance employ 




1980; Baldwin 1985; Flores-Macías and Kreps 2013). Major powers can 
exercise carrot and stick strategies by increasing the imported merchandises or 
by raising trade barriers and placing trading embargoes (Gowa and Mansfield 
2004, 778-783). More specifically, states can impose the highest restrictions on 
trade with target countries using various kinds of negative sanctions such as 
boycott, tariff increase, quotas, dumping, or blacklist. Or, they can use positive 
sanctions to affect the behaviors of trading partners by giving subsidies, 
granting permission to export particular goods or lowering tariffs in general or 
on particular products (Baldwin 1985, 40-42). 
 Previous studies have shown that compliance by states that are more 
dependent on trade relationships results in trade benefits. For example, Davis, 
Fuchs, and Johnson (2017) show that the political behavior of trading partners 
significantly influences the bilateral trade relationship especially with China 
and India where governments can control state-owned companies rather easily. 
To measure the political behavior of states, they focus on two indicators; 
negative political events and voting compliance in the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA). In addition, Flores-Macías and Kreps (2013) test whether 
countries that trade more with China are also more likely to share similar views 
on foreign policy issues as well. They found that weak states that heavily rely 
on trade with China also comply with China in voting. Similarly, Kastner (2016, 




accommodating stance on crucial issues that China cares most about. 
 Earlier studies focusing on economic statecraft argue that major states 
can force compliance of economically smaller states due to asymmetries of 
market power. This is relevant to specific cases where a stronger state obligates 
political acquiescence towards smaller states. As for military issues, on the 
other hand, it can be difficult to enforce the concession of relatively smaller 
states. Even if some allies do not share the same stance on certain specific 
foreign policy issues, they can alter their stances on minor issues with relative 
ease considering the fact that the cost of political support is comparably lower 
than the gains from trade. However, joining a war coalition can be a costly act 
for many allies, even for those allies that are most cooperative on foreign policy 
issues. Since a military contribution to a war coalition is especially demanding 
for participatory states, a coalition leader tries to offer compensation instead of 
compulsion in order to persuade potential partners to contribute to collective 
military efforts and to evaluate their varying levels of commitments in war 
coalitions.  
 
2.5 Summary and Conclusion 
 This study aims to explain how different commitments of states in 
regards to the war coalition affect bilateral trade relationships with the coalition 




war coalitions is correlated with economic benefits. The distinguishing point of 
my study is that I specifically argue that the coalition leader state deals out 
differential treatments in the form of economic benefits in response to the 
varying levels of military contribution by participatory ally states. I distinguish 
state commitments in war coalitions with two different standards; participation 
and the levels of contribution. Thereby this study argues that the amount of 
economic benefits distributed by the coalition leader can highly vary depending 
on the participatory state's level of contribution to the major power because 
partners’ different behavioral patterns lead to differences in compensations. 
 Moreover, this paper examines how a coalition leader utilizes trade as 
a foreign policy tool to attract potential participants and reward their 
contributions to the war coalition. There are various types of economic benefits 
yet easier studies have largely focused on an aid-for-participation deal between 
coalition leader and prospective partners (Tago 2008; Newham 2008, 186-188; 
Henke 2018). In the last six US-led multinational forces, the United States 
actively provides aid package deals in order to build and maintain the war 
coalitions. Apparently, foreign aid is one of the most important and frequently 
used policy instruments for the United States (Sullivan et al 2011, 276) to 
obtain allies’ political compliances in UN voting (Kegley and Hook 1991; 
Wang 1999; Dreher et al 2008), or their support for counterterrorism policy 




not be given for utter aid-for-policy reasons, because its underlying purposes 
are driven by humanitarian concerns (Lumsdaine 1993, 138; Drury et al 2005; 
Nielsen 2010). Even when states did not cooperate in the US-led coalition 
forces, they still received aid for emergency food support, budgetary support, or 
disease control. In terms of the selfish and selfless approach, facing a poverty-
stricken state leads to a selfless policy by the donor state (Heinrich 2013, 424). 
This implies that aid may not be the best indicator to evaluate the commitments 
of states in war coalitions. On the other hand, it is relatively easier for a 
coalition leader to attain foreign policy preferences and achieve strategic policy 
goals by influencing trade patterns. Therefore, economic incentives in the form 
of trade benefits enable examining the effects of varying degrees of 
participation and levels of contribution on compensation discrimination 
towards potential partners. 
 Last but not least, while previous studies are generally founded in 
archival research, I conduct both quantitative analysis and archival research to 
systematically compare the scale of the trade benefits earned from allies 
through participation and contribution. This research examines the case of the 
Vietnam War which exhibits various types and degrees of state participation in 
order to better understand the relationship between types/levels of participation 







3.1 Different Commitments in the Vietnam War Coalition 
This study specifically focuses on the case of the Vietnam War. The Vietnam 
War was part of the Cold War struggles where liberal democratic camp fought 
beside the United States in South Vietnam against Communist aggression. In 
May 1964, President Johnson asked the “Free World” allies to help and support 
the military defense of South Vietnam. In order to create a unified stand against 
communism in Southeast Asia, it was important for more nations of the Free 
World to join “More Flags” program. However, the allies that joined the “Free 
World Military Forces” were the Republic of (South) Korea, the Philippines, 
Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand. The size of those foreign troops 
accounted for 10 percent of the total allied forces. There were two more states, 
Japan and the Republic of China (Taiwan), which contributed to the defeat of 
the Communist regime by assisting the coalition forces as a rear base or 
supplying military materials other than sending their ground troops to South 
Vietnam. Most of the key allies from the Western Bloc, including all the 




 Though there are several other U.S.-led war coalitions, the behavior of 
allies in terms of their participation and contribution are most clearly 
diversified in the case of the Vietnam War. First, there is a clear separation of 
the participant and non-participant allies in the case of the Vietnam War. The 
Korean War and the Vietnam War are similar in that one of the causes of both 
wars was ideological tension during the Cold War. Whereas 15 states joined in a 
multi-national war coalition in the case of the Korean War, only five states 
participated in the Vietnam War. The United States asked of its allies and 
friendly states to demonstrate their solidarity with South Vietnam through the 
deployment of military forces and economic assistance, 2  but only a few 
countries responded to this request. This clear difference in participation during 
the Vietnam War can lead us to find out the difference in the trade relationship 
between allies who joined the coalition and others who did not. 
Furthermore, the war coalition during the Vietnam War exhibits 
identifiable and distinct levels of contribution when compared to more recent 
coalition cases. For instance, about 63 states from the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ 
were involved in the Iraq War with varying levels of contribution. The Vilnius 
group, composed of 10 East European countries, proclaimed their support for a 
US military intervention in Iraq by signing a letter, called “Vilnius Letter” 
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 The United States particularly expected to have favorable responses from West Germany, 
Japan, Italy, and the United Kingdom including initial participants. See Foreign Relations 
of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964, eds. Ronald D. Landa and 




(Newham 2008, 188). The members of the Vilnius group were economically 
weak so their efforts mostly ended in political support.3 However, the United 
States was often willing to acknowledge their verbal support. Likewise, many 
states supported the coalition through economic assistance and political support 
aside from the deployment of troops. Most states that indirectly supported the 
coalition instead of directly deploying troops were small and poor states with 
limited military capabilities. Thus, it is difficult to discern whether such 
countries were authentically less “cooperative” to the United States than 
militarily powerful states that directly participated in the coalition. These 
countries may not contribute with their own manpower on a basis proportional 
to population, but their political and economic support was best effort that they 
could make. Such patterns of indirect supports from small countries can be 
found in other U.S.-led war coalitions.  
 However, allies in the Vietnam War coalition are clearly separable into 
two groups, and there were no countries considered as a member of the 
coalition by making political or economic efforts. States either directly joined 
in the coalition operations by sending troops or indirectly contributed to the war 
by playing the role of a rear base. For these reasons, a clear distinction of state 
behavior in the Vietnam War enables an examination of the impact of allies’ 
varying commitments on trade flows. 
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 Lastly, the distinction between friend and enemy was most evident 
during the Cold War, and political and security tension between the Western 
Bloc and the Eastern Bloc created marked differences in trade as well. During 
this period, the United States tried to promote intra-alliance trade and impede 
cross-alliance trade (Gowa 1995, 3). If we can find a significant difference in 
the amount of trade benefits received among allies even when special emphasis 
is placed on alliances, this result would best support the argument of this paper. 
 
3.2 Textile and Apparel Trade Benefits As Incentive 
Major states can differently respond to allies’ performances both by 
discriminately rewarding and punishing their partners. There are examples that 
the United States attempts to coerce other countries into supporting its military 
missions by punishing them. For instance, when Yemen voted against the 
authorization of the Gulf War in 1991, the United States cut its entire aid budget 
to Yemen (Anderson et al. 2003, 1). However, requesting the deployment of 
ally soldiers to a battlefield is a different problem. The United States, as a 
coalition leader, recognizes that it can be a costly choice for the allies; it is 
more likely to reward the participants rather than punish the non-contributors. 
Accordingly, if there is a difference in trade relationship among participants in 
the Vietnam War, it is likely due to preferential treatment by the United States 




contributors. From this perspective, trade benefits are expected to increase 
according to the degree of contribution of the alliance. Thus, I test the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis: Allies that contribute more to coalitions are more likely to be 
rewarded with trade benefits by the coalition leader. 
 
 To measure trade benefits what the United States offered to its allies 
that joined in the coalition, this study investigates bilateral trade flows in textile 
and apparels. Textile has been one of the main export products for the U.S. 
alliances during the Cold War (Baldwin 1984). For Asian states, exporting raw 
materials were particularly important due to their limited economic 
infrastructures. Textile trading was also an important issue for the European 
countries as well.4 Therefore, the impact of ally's contributions on trade can be 
effectively assessed by observing trade flows of textile and clothing products 
during the Vietnam War period. If the United States decided to reward the most 
cooperative partners with trade benefits, then there would be a more significant 
increase in textile trade flows among war coalition participants than non-
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 In 1970, the United States passed a trade bill which adopted a protectionist measure. The 
European countries argued that the bill would have had a considerable adverse effect on 
their economies, specifically pointing out the quotas on textiles. See U.S. Congress. Senate. 
1971. Committee on Finance, 1971, Trade politics in the 1970’s. A Report by Senate 




participants during the given period. 
 This paper verifies the hypothesis in two steps. First, statistical 
analysis tests to find out the difference in trade volume among allies who 
behave differently. Next, I use in-depth case study analysis by comparing the 
processes of profit negotiation between South Korea and Taiwan as to figure 





Commitments vs. Trade 
 
4.1 Data and Variables 
A. Dependent Variable 
For the textile trade flows, I use the World Trade Flows dataset from the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) (Feenstra et al. 2005) which 
records a set of bilateral trade volume by commodities.5 Since the data is 
classified by the Standard International Trade Classification (Revision 2), I only 
select textile products which are categorized under ‘Division 26’. 6  The 
dependent variable of this study is the states’ share of the U.S. total textile trade 
volume, calculated by dividing the state’s total textile export volume to the 
United States by the sum of the U.S. total textile import volume in a year from 
1962 to 1975. I focus on the share of trade volume instead of the actual volume 
alone because the latter may not reflect the effects of an state’s contribution on 
trade flows. Major textile trading partners are likely to maintain previous trade 
                                                          
5
 There is the U.S. Import and Export dataset that have been assembled by Feenstra, but the 
data 1 covers period after 1972. The case of this study required information on trade flows 
before 1964. Also, there is the data that covers the longer period from 1958 to 1994 for the 
world trade flows, however it is on a multilateral basis which does not deal with bilateral 
trade relationships. In these concern, I chose the NBER World Trade Flows dataset for the 
analysis. 
6
 Division 26 indicates the items of textile fibers and their wastes including six, cotton, and 




patterns regardless of their contributions to the war coalition. Even if some 
states gain benefits in trade by joining in coalitions, a moderate increase in 
actual amounts of trade volume may not be a salient observation due to the 
largest trading partners. Thus, an observation of the state’s share in the U.S. 
textile imports can indicate just how much trade benefits were provided by the 
United States. 
 
B. Independent Variable 
Independent variable of this study is the difference in the commitments of 
potential partners during the Vietnam War. State behaviors were categorized 
into three groups. First, ‘Non-participation’ refers to most of the U.S. allies and 
like-minded states that did not participate in the coalition. During the given 
period, 32 countries were included in this group.7 Next, ’Low Contribution’ is 
comprised of those countries that contributed indirectly to the coalitions. The 
U.S. armed forces were staged and deployed in Japan and Taiwan so as to take 
advantage of their geographical advantages. Both states assisted the United 
States in the distance but did not deploy military forces.8 Therefore, Japan and 
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. To identify potential participants of the Vietnam War coalition, I refer to the Correlates of 
War (COW) Alliances dataset, which classifies alliance portfolios into four different ways; 
‘defense pact’, ‘neutrality and no aggression pact’, ‘entente’ and ‘no alliance’. I count every 
country except those who record ‘no alliance’ with the United States during the given 
period. Most of these 32 countries that are included in ‘Non-participation’ group were the 
U.S.’s core allies. 
8
 Japan undertook civilian assistance on a few military projects but not on a broad basis. 




Taiwan partly contributed to the coalition by acting as a rear base for war 
operations. The ‘High Contribution’ category consists of only five countries 
including South Korea, Thailand, Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, all 
of which deployed their soldiers to South Vietnam and carried out missions as 
members of multi-national forces. Joining the war coalition by sending combat 
troops inevitably entails a great risk in that the soldiers of their own countries 
can be sacrificed. Thus I regarded that they made a full commitments to the 
coalition. I created dummy sets for each type of behavior in order to examine 
the effect of different levels of commitment on trade. 
 
C. Control Variables 
The first control variable that I include in the study is the state’s textile trade 
pattern in the global market. Leading textile exporters worldwide are most 
likely to export a substantial amount of textile products to the United States 
since the U.S. was one of the largest textile markets in the world. I calculate the 
global market share in the same way as in the dependent variable. The NBER 
World Trade Flow dataset includes records of ‘world’ trade flow from both the 
perspective of the importer and the exporter. Thus, I divide an individual state’s 
textile export volume to world by the total sum of world textile import volume.  
 Also, political factors influence international trade patterns. A 
                                                                                                                                                   





similarity in political systems encourages bilateral connections. Thus pairs of 
states that share political structure have more trade than those that do not 
(Linder 1961, 17; Pollins 1989a; Dixon and Moon 1993, 11; Morrow et al. 
1998). To measure the individual state’s political similarity with the United 
States, I rely on the democracy score from the Polity IV dataset. The democracy 
score is obtained by subtracting a country’s autocracy score from its democracy 
score. The score ranges from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated 
democracy), resulting in a regime authority spectrum. Since the regime type of 
the United States is invariably a consolidated democracy, I first calculate the 
democracy score difference between the two states by subtracting the individual 
state’s score from the United States’. Then I subtract its absolute value from 
10.9 
 Another control variable measures the similarity of alliance portfolios. 
Alliance portfolio measures the similarity of states’ alliance interests and 
policies; states with similar alliance portfolios have strong alliance commitment 
which leads to having similar security interests, while states with dissimilar 
alliance portfolios have conflicting security interests (Signorino and Ritter 
1999). The importance of alliances to the United States varies by state. It can be 
expected that a state that has identical alliance portfolios with the United States 
is likely to have a strong bilateral connection, leading to greater volume in trade 
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flows. By using the weighted S score on global levels of Signorino and Ritter 
(1999),10 I take into account a variety of alliance portfolios. The S score is 
assigned a value between -1 and +1, where -1 represents complete discordance 
in portfolios, +1 represents complete concordance in portfolios. Since this study 
only considers allies of the United States, the lowest score is still higher than 
0.1.  
 Finally, it is widely recognized that a state’s export capacity is related 
to its GDP and population. To include GDP into the model, I use GDP data 
from the Maddison project11. I used Maddison Database version 2010, which 
covers GDP from 1 to 2008 AD. It is expressed in million 1990 International 
Geary-Khamis dollars. The population indicates a country’s domestic market 
size— the larger a country’s population, the higher the capacity of the state in 
satisfying domestic demand with domestically produced products. In this case, 
there is a lower demand for imports. Hence, trade flows are inversely related to 
the population size (Mansfield and Bronson 1997, 97).  
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 I use S score over Tau-b score for understanding alliance portfolio because tau-b is 
inappropriate to use as an indicator of the similarity of states’ foreign policy positions. Tau-
b reflects ordinal rankings of alliance portfolios, thus limiting to apprehend the spatial 
positions of the policy portfolios diverge between the two countries. This can be a problem 
for example, when state i and j have just discordant alliance portfolios, yet tau-b assumes 
that these countries have completely dissimilar alliance commitments (Signario and Ritter, 
1999). 
11
 For the GDP data, I rely on Maddison project, instated of using the World Bank database. 
The World Bank does not list Taiwan as a separate country, thereby data of Taiwan is added 
to the data for China. In this study, however, Taiwan is an important actor that partly 




4.2 Time Period 
The time span of this research is 14 years from 1962 to 1975. After President 
Johnson asked for allies’ cooperation in multinational military actions, only five 
states responded to this request and sent troops in 1964. The United States 
began to gradually withdraw its troops starting in 1970 and the direct U.S. 
military involvement ended in 1973 as the peace treaty was signed between the 
governments of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and the 
Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) on January 27, 1973.12 Foreign troops 
withdrew their soldiers in a similar manner. In general, the prospective war 
coalition participants can discuss the terms of their participation with the 
coalition leader in advance of the war. However, the actual payment of 
incentives by the coalition leader may take some time. Therefore, I observed 
the U.S.’s allies textile trade flows two years before and after the formation of 
the Vietnam war coalition.  
 
4.3 Changes in Trade Flows 
Figure 3 is a descriptive illustration which shows the variations in textile and 
apparel trade flows over time from 1962 to 1975 by degree of participation and 
contribution. I calculate the average of states' annual percentage of textile 
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 The Paris Peace Accords is officially titled the Agreement on Ending the War and 




exports to the United States by each group. Whereas there is a near absence of 
changes in trade flows for the group of Non-participant states, it is clearly 
observable that there is a salient increase in trade flows for participant states 
especially before and after 1964 when the requests and negotiations for 
deployment of troops in Vietnam began. More specifically, categorizing 
participant states according to their levels of contribution shows that those with 
high contributions to the coalition experienced an overall increase in trade 
flows. Although low contribution states undergo an increase in average 
percentage of exports post-1971, this descriptive flows of Figure 3 is still 
consistent with the hypothesis that states with higher contributions in a war 










To test the hypothesis, I apply the system Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM). This study includes unbalanced panel data on 39 countries over the 
period of 1962-1975. It has been criticized that pooled time-series cross-
sectional estimation do not deal with unobserved differences across countries 
(Green et al. 2001, 442). If there is a contemporaneous correlation of 
individual- and time-specific effects and the explanatory variables, pooled 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) can generate biased estimation (Woodridge 2010, 
307-314). Applying fixed effects estimation can address this problem.   
 However, one more concern that must be dealt with for this study is to 
capture dynamic effects of trade flows. Trade flows in time 𝑡 are heavily 
determined by its past level in time 𝑡 − 1. To address this, lagged dependent 
variables are included in the model. However, the strict exogeneity assumption 
never holds in unobserved effects models with lagged dependent variables 
(Woodridge 2010, 290). Due to the endogeneity problems, fixed effects 
estimators can also be biased and inconsistent in this dynamic panel data model. 
To produce a consistent parameter estimation, Arellano and Bond (1991) 
suggest the GMM methodology. The basic model of dynamic panel data 
between the dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡 and a single covariate x𝑖𝑡 is 
 





where μ𝑖  denotes unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity and e𝑖𝑡  is the 
idiosyncratic error term. The GMM estimation method is based on the model of 
first differences in order to remove individual-specific effects in panel data 
models. The model can be expressed as below.  
 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛾∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽∆𝑥𝑖𝑡 +  ∆𝑒𝑖𝑡 
 
However, as shown in Equation 2, there still remains a correlation between the 
first-differenced lagged dependent variable and the first-differenced error term 
as below, 
 
Cov(∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1, ∆𝑒𝑖𝑡) = Cov(𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 −  𝑦𝑖𝑡−2, 𝑒𝑖𝑡 − 𝑒𝑖𝑡−1) ≠ 0 
 
Arellano and Bond suggest that the lagged values of the dependent variable 
could be valid instruments in the differenced equations. In this case, y𝑖𝑡−2, 
y𝑖𝑡−3, …, which is the lagged values of y𝑖𝑡−1, can be used as valid instrumental 
variables for ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1. This is the standard difference-GMM estimation.  
 Difference-GMM estimator, however, raises large finite sample bias 
and imprecision “when autoregressive parameter γ  in the Equation 1 is 
moderately large and the number of time series observations is moderately 





variables are weak instruments for first differences. Later, Blundell and Bond 
(1998; 2000) propose the extended system GMM estimator, which provides 
more precise estimates by making up for the weak instrument problem of the 
difference-GMM estimator. System GMM obtains additional moment 
conditions and uses ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 as a instrument for 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1. I analyze the effects of 
states’ contributions on trade flows by using the system GMM estimator.  
 Two different tests are required in order to find out whether the 
instruments have validity and whether the estimator is consistent. First, Sargan 
or Hansen tests can check the validity of the instruments. The over-
identification problem indicates that there are more instruments than necessary 
to estimate the model. Hence, the null hypothesis, which indicates that over-
identification restrictions are valid, should not be rejected so that using the 
instruments are determined to be appropriate. Another test is the Arellano-Bond 
autocorrelation test of the residuals. To confirm whether the estimates are 
consistent, model should have first-order autocorrelation but should have no 
evidence for second-order autocorrelation. The presence of second-order 
autocorrelation implies that the instruments are correlated with the error term. 
Therefore, in order to validate the use of System GMM, I need to reject the null 
hypothesis of AR1 test, affirming that there is a serial correlation, while fail to 






4.5 Findings and Discussions 
Table 1 presents a series of results which confirm that states’ different 
behaviors in the Vietnam War coalition have statistically significant and large 
effect on textile trade flows. Column 1 and 2 of Table 1 both apply OLS 
estimation, but only the second column includes the lagged dependent variable 
in the model. While the results of the first OLS estimation display the strongest 
effects on trade flows, R-squared of the second OLS estimation shows that the 
current level of trade flows may be affected by its past level. Results using 
System GMM estimation of column 3 support this presumption as well.  
 Given the presence of all dummy variables leads to perfect 
multicollinearity, the coefficients for ‘Low Contribution’ and ‘High 
Contribution’ are measured relative to the reference category, ‘Non-
Participation’. Coefficients of these two categories both have higher values 
since states that participated in the coalition earn more benefits on trade flows 
than the default group. Also, states that contributed to the coalition at the 
highest level through the deployment of troops had higher import flows than 
states that indirectly contributed to the coalition. System GMM estimation 
gives proper results. First, the Sargan test does not reject the over-identifying 
restrictions at the conventional levels of significance. As expected, the 
Arellano-Bond test also confirms that there is first-order autocorrelation. It sug- 





Notes:  *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Results of system GMM are based on the two-step estimator. Standard errors of 
the System GMM are presented by the Windmeijer (2005)’s finite sample 
correction for the variance of linear two-step GMM estimators. System GMM 
estimation gives proper results. First, the Sargan test does not reject the over-
identifying restrictions at the conventional levels of significance. As expected, 
the Arellano-Bond test also confirms that there is first-order autocorrelation 
while there is no evidence for significant second-order autocorrelation. It 
suggests that instruments are not correlated with the error term. 




gests that instruments are not correlated with the error term. 
Figure 4 illustrates the predicted effects of state behavior on trade 
flows by holding other variables at their means. The effect of state behavior is 
especially large when states show the highest levels of contribution. All these 
results indicate that different behavioral patterns of state in war coalitions meet 
correspondingly different effects on trade flows. That is, the United States 
rewarded its states proportionately according to the degree of cooperation in 
war. 





Comparative Case Study of Textile Trade 
 
In this section, I examine the effects of state behavior in the war coalition on 
preferential trade benefits using a comparative case study. I compare the United 
States’ decision-making process for trade policy with South Korea and Taiwan 
during the Vietnam War. South Korea was the highest contributing state in the 
coalition, and Taiwan made low and indirect contributions. Between the 1960s 
and the 1970s, South Korea and Taiwan shared some important parallels. 
Particularly, they had evolved very similar patterns in three categories: national 
capabilities, the relationship with the United States as the coalition leader, and 
the importance of the textile industry in domestic economic growth. However, 
there was a difference in their levels of contribution to the Vietnam War 
coalition, which led to the differences in textile trade benefits from the United 
States. 
 
5.1 Similarities between South Korea and Taiwan 
A. National Capability 




of economic development and national capabilities. According to the Maddison 
Project Database, the average gross domestic product (GDP) between 1962 to 
1975 of South Korea was about $64,000, and Taiwan was about $32,000. While 
South Korea’s GDP is more than 2 times of Taiwan, their average GDP per 
capita was similar; during the same period, South Korea’s average GDP per 
capita was $2,029 and Taiwan’s was $2,273.13 Also, the National Material 
Capabilities data set from the Correlates of War Projects offers the Composite 
Index of National Capability (CINC) index of each country. This index is based 
on annual values for the total and urban population, iron and steel production, 
energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure. The average 
CINC score of South Korea was 0.009 and Taiwan was 0.006 in the given 
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period. Figure 5 shows descriptive statistics, which graphically depict average 
GDP, GDP per capita, and CINC score of all participants between 1962 to 1975. 
Both economic and national capability indexes present South Korea from the 
‘high contribution’ group and Taiwan from the ‘low contribution’ group as 
being very similar. 
 
B. The Relationship with the United States 
South Korea and Taiwan were important to the United States in maintaining 
peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region. In the 1960s, the United States 
worried that communist aggression could take over the remaining regions of the 
Indochina peninsula. US foreign policymakers’ major concerns of a “Domino 
Effect” in the Far East were most heightened when they realized that they could 
lose South Vietnam and Laos. They assumed that the outcomes of South 
Vietnam and Laos would support the aggressive movement in the near 
Southeast Asian region, assisting a successive and speedy collapse of those 
neighboring countries. In the memorandum to the Director of Central 
Intelligence, John McCone, the member of the Board of National Estimates, 
Sherman Kent, emphasized that “the loss of South Vietnam and Laos would 
lead almost inevitably to the communization of other states in the area, and 
perhaps beyond the area”.14 
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 A continuation of the spread of communism made both South Korea 
and Taiwan strategically important to the United States. This was because the 
United States had publicly and persistently committed to preventing the 
Communist takeover of South Vietnam and Laos to the free world. Losing these 
two places could be followed by a loss of prestige of the United States among 
free world allies. Also, it could debase the credibility of the United States’ will 
and moreover, weaken the solidarity of several countries in the free world.15 
Foreign policymakers of the United States tried to anticipate which countries 
could possibly be disconcerted by a failure of the United States in South 
Vietnam and Laos and doubt the firmness of US commitments in the given area, 
thereby shifting toward a neutralist position.16  In the situation where the 
cooperation between the US and the rest of the free world could potentially be 
destabilized, South Korea and Taiwan became essential for checking further 
Communist expansion in the Asia Pacific Region. 
 More specifically, South Korea played a prominent role in the U.S. 
security strategy for regional stability in East Asia and the Pacific area. South 
Korea and the United States had developed a military alliance after the Korean 
War and since then, the United States continued to serve as a guarantor of 
South Korea's national security. With Japan, the other pillar of the U.S.-Japan-
                                                                                                                                                   









Korea security triangle, Korea undergirded East Asian defense throughout the 
Cold War era (Cha 1999; 2000, 262). 
 Taiwan carried out an important role in resisting the advance of 
Chinese communists with the United States. In 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed 
the establishment of the new Chinese state, the People’s Republic of China. The 
Communist uprising in mainland China triggered popular support for 
Communism in Myanmar, the Federation of Malaya and other places. Ever 
since China gained eventual Communist victory, Taiwan became one of the 
staunch allies of the United States for preventing Communist control of China. 
The mutual defense treaty of 1955 signed with the United States led Taiwan to 
embark upon active military roles such as a defense against direct mainland 
attack. Also, the United States army maintained military bases on Taiwan so 
that they could get Taiwan’s defense assistance to the United States. US foreign 
policymakers assured that Taiwan would never seek to accommodate the 
Communists, and this belief continued to drive a strong US-Taiwan alliance.17  
 Regarding the US actions in the Vietnam War, Taiwan gave its 
continuing support from the beginning of the war. For example, during the Gulf 
of Tonkin incident on August 2, 1964, the United States tried to urge 
responsible military action to refrain from further armed attack in the United 
Nations Security Council. Supports from seven members of the Security 






Council out of ten including France were as yet undetermined, but Taiwan 
made appropriate statements of support to the United States with UK and 
Bolivia.18 Also, Taiwan revealed its preferences for extreme U.S. actions even 
including a risk of war with Communist China, which differentiates them from 
all other Asian countries.19 Taiwan’s role as a staunch ally to the United States 
continued until 1979 when the US formally established diplomatic relations 
with the People’s Republic of China. 
 These facts indicate that both South Korea and Taiwan were valuable 
assets to the United States as anti-communist forces and as main supporters of 
the US position in the Far East.  
 
C. The Importance of the Textile Industry in Domestic Economic Growth 
In the reconstruction period after the Korean War, the textile industry played a 
key role in the economic development of South Korea. At the end of the Korean 
War in 1953, most of the economic infrastructure and facilities were destroyed 
or damaged. To promote and rebuild economic stability, the South Korean 
government committed to postwar restoration projects with the assistance of 
foreign aid provided by the United States. The cotton textile and apparel 
industries were one of the main sectors in which the Korean government most 
                                                          
18
 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964, eds. 
Ronald D. Landa and Charles S. Sampson (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1992), 
Document 288 
19




actively invested in during this period. Soon after, the textile and apparel 
industries achieved explosive export expansion thanks to the stable foundations 
that were laid out so as to foster entry into the global market and active 
government-led investment.  
 In the 1960s and 1970s, the Korean government involved themselves 
in industrial undertakings by implementing export-based industrialization. 
Through the First (1962-1966) and Second (1967-1972) Five-Year development 
plan, the Park government placed emphasis on government-led, outward-
oriented economic strategy. The Park government mainly invested in raw 
material-oriented industries such as agricultural sectors and light manufacturing 
enterprises which do not require high-tech production equipment. Therefore, 
the major export items of South Korea in this period consisted of either raw 
material such as textiles, garments, plywood, and food processing or simple 
manufactured items (Kim 1991, 5).  
 Textile exports accounted for only 10.8% of the total export in 1961, 
but it represented more than a two-fold increase in 1964, which indicated 
27.5%. The textile industry held a 38.2 percent share in the total export by the 
end of 1967, and it approached almost 40% in 1969 (Lee, 113). Among various 
types of fabrics, natural fibers such as cotton, wool, and silk were most actively 
exported in the early periods. Until 1962, raw cotton for export was less than 10% 




export volumes of cotton textile sharply increased to the point where half of the 
total national production was exported (Seo 2009, 157). Well into the mid-
1960's, South Korea's exported textiles were expanded to included natural 
fibers and man-made fibers such as nylon and polyester. As a result of active 
government-led investment, the Korean textile industries spearheaded 
economic development in South Korea's postwar settlement. 
 Similarly, Taiwan also carried out an export-driven policy and the 
textile and apparel industries were their leading sectors as well (Cumings 1984, 
1). Government-led economic development in the period between 1953 and 
1964 provided a basis for significant growth of the cotton textile industry. For 
example, the Ministry of Economic Affairs established a special committee to 
carry out plans to expand the textile industry or give out tax incentives. As a 
result of the government’s effort, the cotton textile enterprise developed into the 
biggest industry aside from the sugar processing industry since the 1960s (Mao 
and Schive 1995, 41-2). The number of cotton spindles began with 10,000, but 
soon afterward the industry was equipped with more than 500,000 spindles.20 
In 1962 and 1963, Taiwan’s annual cotton output was nearly 300 million yards, 
but the domestic consumption was not even half the total output as the island is 
subtropical and there was a growing popularity of man-made fibers. A sizeable 
stockpile of cotton textiles was thus exported. Overseas textile sale in 1954 was 
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$336,000 in US dollars but it soared to 44 million dollars in 1963. Especially, 
the proportion of textile export to the total export was just 15% when the 
Vietnam War occurred, but it became 33.7% by the time the war was over 
(Baldwin and Nelson 1993, 9). 
 South Korea and Taiwan’s economic achievements in such a short 
period of time are often labeled as ‘economic miracles’, and these countries are 
recognized as the ‘Four Asian Tigers’ along with Singapore and Hong Kong. 
Such similar historical patterns of economic growth were possible because 
Korea and Taiwan constructed government-led macroeconomic reform and 
industrial policy. Their economic strategies were primarily based on export-
oriented development. Textiles had been the leading exports and a major source 
of foreign exchange earnings since the 1960s. Also, both had comparative 
advantages deriving from cheap labor costs in foreign marketplaces, for the 
textile and garment industries are labor intensive in nature. Therefore, the 
volume of exports increased sharply and Korea and Taiwan’s economies 
became increasingly dependent on textile trade. Given that the United States 
was the largest source of Korean and Taiwanese textile and apparel imports, 
establishing a stable trade relationship with the United States in the textile 
products was extremely important to both governments especially between the 





5.2 South Korea and Taiwan’s Contribution to the  
Vietnam War Coalition 
Among six different participants of the Vietnam War, South Korea and Taiwan 
were the most similar cases in terms of their levels of economic development, 
national capabilities, the relationship with the United States during the Cold 
War, and the textile and apparel industry’s standing in economic development. 
However, they contributed to the Vietnam War coalition in different ways. 
 
A. Korea 
South Korea participated in the Vietnam War by sending combat troops. 
Korea’s contribution to the coalition varied over time in size and characteristics 
of forces dispatched. Overall, South Korean forces were the second largest 
foreign military presence after the United States in Vietnam with a total of more 
than 300,000 military personnel. The first Korean units consisted of non-
military brigade groups including medical teams and Taekwondo instructor 
units. In March 1965, the Korean government deployed additional support 
forces, known as the “Dove Force”, to South Vietnam. Primary missions of this 
engineer brigade consisted of construction assistance. Until mid-1965, 
policymakers of the Johnson administration was reluctant to increase its 
military presence in Vietnam and thus attempted to avoid deploying ground 




of the South Korean government was mainly confined to civilian operations 
during this period. Soon after, Johnson decided to escalate the war in Vietnam 
and increased its involvement because the situation in South Vietnam had 
worsened and the communist regime in North Vietnam showed no signs of 
waning. 
 Responding to the request for additional combat troops, the Korean 
government willingly responded with commitments to President Johnson.21 In 
October 1965, South Korea entered into an active combat role in Vietnam. The 
Korean government decided to deploy an army division and a naval brigade to 
embark upon military missions in the frontline. Later in September 1966, Korea 
sent additional reinforcements comprised of one army division and regiment to 
back up the coalition. The numbers of troops from South Korea were much 
greater than any other coalition participants that had deployed combat troops. 
The Korean forces were the largest among participants and second only to the 
U.S. military force. As compared to the total population, South Korea had sent 
more troops in percentage than the U.S. had done.22 There had been a gradual 
increase in the number of troops since the coalition was formed, and the 
number peaked in 1969. The size of the Korean army dispatched to South 
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Vietnam indicates that South Korea maintained the highest levels of 
contribution to support the U.S.-led military coalition even amongst other 
participatory states that had deployed combat troops to the frontline. 
 
B. Taiwan 
Taiwan, as the western Pacific offshore defense perimeter, assisted the U.S. 
military force in Vietnam by providing one of the major support bases (Garver 
2015: 126). Taiwan is geographically associated with Northern Vietnam so it 
kept expanding its military assistance to the United States primarily on air 
operations during the war. For instance, three squadrons of C-130 transport 
aircraft were redeployed from Clark Field in the Philippines and Okinawa to the 
Ching Chuan Kang (CCK) air base.23 The C-130s entered service on one- to 
two-week cycles, then returned to the CCK air base for maintenance. Also, they 
assisted the movement of U.S. troops between South Vietnam and offshore U.S. 
bases located in other Asian countries (Garver 2015: 132). Four additional C-
130s were deployed to the CCK airbase in 1972. Other military aircrafts 
stationed at the CCK air base provided procurement and logistical services or 
air refueling operations. 
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 Moreover, the United States required third-country military 
engineering aid during the war. Taiwan provided the primary offshore repair 
and maintenance network because of its advantageous geographical location. 
The U.S. military forces in South Vietnam repaired and rebuilt heavy military 
gears and vehicles such as army trucks, jeeps, electrical generators, armored 
personnel carriers, and trucks in Taiwan because they could obtain lower 
transport costs if these heavy equipment were transported to Taiwan. Also, 
Taiwan assisted the United States by offering military engineers for repairing 
bridges on the lines of communications when they were damaged by the 
flood.24 
 Once, Taiwan also considered sending troops to South Vietnam. 
Chiang Kai-shek, the former President of Taiwan suggested to Admiral Jerauld 
Wright, the Ambassador to the Republic of China, and Harry D. Felt, the 
commander in chief of Pacific Command, that Taiwan could offer further 
contributions by sending armed forces to North Vietnam (Larsen and Collins 
1985, 115). Policymakers of the United States partially agreed that deploying 
Taiwanese ground troops to South Vietnam seemed a desirable option from a 
military point of view. At the same time, however, they worried that this move 
would cause turbulence in the international system because Taiwan’s active 
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military role in South Vietnam could be seen as a prelude to another war with 
Communist China (ibid, 116-7).25  As the Taiwanese government publicly 
expressed that their enemy was Communist China more than North Vietnam, 
the United States was wary of Taiwan’s military involvement in the Vietnam 
War. Eventually, the United States had paid a great sense of attention to China’ 
intervention in the Vietnam War as they did in the Korean War, and thus did not 
approve the expanded role of Taiwan. Therefore, Taiwan’s contribution to the 
Vietnam War coalition ended up supporting military operations from the rear. 
 While South Korea gave its full commitments, Taiwan was indirectly 
involved in the war in a supporting role, avoiding the risk of injury or death of 
their soldiers. Given the costs and risks involved in deploying combat troops, 
we can conclude that Korea was more committed to the coalition than Taiwan 
was.  
 
5.3 Textile Trade Relationships between the United States  
and Korea versus Taiwan 
The United States, as a coalition leader, is more likely to reward more 
cooperative partners with trade benefits. In this case, there would be a more 
significant increase in textile trade flows among war coalition participants 
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showing high-contributions than participants showing low-contributions or 
non-participants during the given period. In order to examine the effects of 
alliance behaviors in the war coalition on bilateral trade relationships, I 
compare foreign policymaking process in regards to trade negotiations between 
the United States and two participants with different levels of contribution: 
South Korea and Taiwan. I mainly refer to the Foreign Relations of the United 
States (FRUS), which records major U.S. foreign policy decisions, and some 
official trade agreements. The main purpose of the archival research is to 
observe whether there were negotiations for trade benefits―either in the form 
of increasing quotas on textile exports or removing a restriction on import of 
textiles― and whether the United States deliberately attempted to reward 
favors in trade. 
 This case study covers the period from 1964 to the late 1960's, which 
is shorter than the time span of the statistical analysis in the previous section. 
Since it takes time for the coalition leader to complete the payment, the 
statistical analysis includes an extended period of time in which it is assumed 
that coalition partners received the full side-payment. Case studies, on the other 
hand, focus on whether there were solid negotiations between a coalition leader 
and prospective participants about the side-payment, thereby granting great 
favors to the coalition partners. Since the United States requested additional 




1970, it can be assumed that negotiations for profit would primarily be focused 
in the mid to late 1960's. The following will attempt to explain how South 
Korea and Taiwan proceeded with textile trade negotiations and consequently 




Historical documents show that the United States and the South Korean 
government discussed the provision of trade benefits in the form of textile 
products. Right before the Korean government sent its first troops to Vietnam, 
Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State of the United States visited South Korea in 
order to investigate the priority agendas of the Korean government and to find 
mutual interests. The Korean government presented its views and positions on 
priority agendas to Rusk including how the United States could support 
Korean’s economic stabilization and development plan. Specifically, the 
Korean government requested of the United States to take into immediate and 
favorable consideration seven different points, but specifically focused on the 
trade issue as can be seen below;26  
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“the overall trade and commercial policy toward Korea should be re-
examined in more favorable terms and the restriction imposed on the 
quota for the Korean textile goods should be relaxed.” 
 
 Similarly, the president of South Korea, Park Chung-hee, asked for 
favorable conditions for Korean imports in a conversation with the U.S. 
Secretary of State. Although president Park did not directly refer to specific 
products, foreign policymakers of the United States conjectured that the Korean 
government yearned for better deals on textile quotas.27 Korea’s requests were 
realized after they sent their first deployment of troops to South Vietnam. In the 
president’s cabinet textile advisory committee meeting of January 14, 1965, 
James Love, the Deputy to the Secretary of Commerce, stated that “the United 
States had negotiated an agreement with Korea on terms which are more 
generous than those for any other country”.28  
 The statement of Love is well reflected in the ‘Trade in Cotton Textile’ 
agreement signed between South Korea and the United States on January 26, 
1965. This agreement dealt with “re-examining the overall US trade and 
commercial policy on Korea towards more favorable terms and relaxing the 
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restriction imposed on the quota for Korean textile goods”.29 Aside from the 
extended quotas on cotton textiles, the overall ceiling for other textile articles 
such as wool and man-made fibers were also increased. The total level of 
restrained and unrestrained trade increased from 16 million square yards to 26 
million after the negotiation. 30  Since the GATT Long-Term Arrangement 
Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles (LTA) lasted for 5 years 
beginning in 1962, most Asian countries were supposed to renegotiate on 
exports of textile products with the United States in 1967. However, Korea was 
able to attain trade benefits on textile and apparel even before 1967.   
 Trade negotiations on textile agreements further continued as the 
Korean government actively joined U.S. combat operations by deploying 
ground combat forces and increasing its troops level. In return for providing a 
full combat division plus a non-combat engineering unit to Vietnam around 
June 1965, foreign policymakers of the United States discussed ways to give 
some tangible trade benefits to Korea for its active response to US request for 
troops31. Because the American public’s support for the Vietnam War decreased 
as the war continued, the U.S. government required additional assistance from 
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their foreign coalition partners within six months.32 On December 16, 1965, 
Winthrop G. Brown, the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea gave a full 
exposition on the Vietnam War situation and delivered a message requesting 
additional troop contributions from South Korea. Six days later, President Park 
agreed that Korea should send additional troops to South Vietnam and South 
Korea's fourth deployment of troops was privately agreed upon.3334 After the 
decision for additional deployment, ongoing textiles negotiations gained more 
specificity.  
 First, according to a letter from the embassy in Korea to the U.S. 
Department of State, Ambassador Brown specifically made the following 
statement on December 28, 1965.35 
 
“There are many ways in which we can make our formative 
influence helpful [to Korea]. … If for example, over the next few 
weeks and months there should be a series of favorable procurement 
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actions for South Vietnam, … , or a better textile quota, … , the 
psychological effect here would be very constructive.” 
 
This suggestion indicates that foreign policymakers of the United States kept 
offering textile trade benefits in exchange for an additional deployment of 
troops from South Korea.  
 Also, Korea made a list, entitled the ‘Economic and Financial Supports 
Suggested for Review by USG [the United States Government]’ which includes 
the items that South Korea requested from the United States for its contribution 
to the Vietnam War. Among 10 items regarding various kinds of economic 
support, the South Korean government specifically mentioned “Encouragement 
Korean exports to the U.S. and Lift U.S. quota on Korean textiles”, demanding 
better deals on Korean textile quotas.36 Policymakers of the United States 
considered the requested items as unrealistic since they failed to meet the basic 
assistance criteria including financial capacity, or statutory and policy 
limitations. They considered the list unrealistic and unreasonable. For example, 
in a conversation with President Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Secretary of 
Defense of the United States, described that “Koreans want about $600-700 
million worth of cumshaw for the additional troops”. However, there was a 
good chance that such reactions were mostly based on the Korean’s demands on 
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other items such as development loans or military assistance programs instead 
of its wishes on trade benefits37 because Korea anyway received the higher 
textile quotas in the 1967 bilateral textile agreement than before. 
Figure 6 shows the variation in the percentage of textile exports of 
South Korea and Taiwan to the United States during the period from 1962 to 
1975. The Korean government sent its foreign troops in June 1964, which led to 
an 8% increase in the percentage of textile exports to the U.S. from 1964 to 
1965. In January 1965, Korea sent its second non-combat troops to support 
civilian operations in South Vietnam. Five months later, the first Korean 
combat forces were deployed to assume a more direct combat role in the 
Vietnam War. Both, and especially the latter contribution brought an explosive 
increase in Korean exports of textile and apparel products to the United States 
between 1965 and 1966. While the percentage of exports to the United States in 
1965 was only 0.67%, it increased by about 57% in 1965, reaching 1.05%. 
Additional Korean forces were deployed to South Vietnam during 1966 and due 
to this further troop contribution, exports of Korean textiles to the US had 
continued its upward movement until 1967, and the percentage reached its 
highest point, 1.3%. By the time the South Korean government completed its 
last deployment, the percentage of Korean textile exports to the USA had 
almost doubled since South Korea joined the Vietnam War coalition. The perce- 






ntage went down between 1967 and 1968, but Korea maintained the increase in 
its proportion of textile exports to the USA until 1969. 
 There is a sharp decrease in percentage after 1969 and soon it returns 
to the same level as pre-1964. It is partly because the United States changed its 
trade policy in the textile and apparel industry from the 1970s. As a great 
volume of imported textiles and apparels were being brought into the country, 
there was a growing protectionist sentiment in textile industries and in the 
Congress (Baldwin et al 1995, 122). They pressured government efforts to 
examine the textile situation in the domestic market by the late 1960s. In an 
attempt to relieve influential opposition voices, President Nixon assured prompt 
action to limit the import of certain textiles and extend the concept of 
Figure 6.  Variations in the Percentage of Textile Exports of  




international trade agreements to all other textile articles.38 As a result of the 
textile agreement in 1971, most of the main textile importers including South 
Korea had to voluntarily impose a gradual restriction on their textile quotas. At 
a similar time, there was a structural change in the Korean economy; the 
government undertook an expansion of the heavy chemical industry. Light 
industries such as textile and food processing that had led the export boom 
throughout the 1960s were replaced by heavy machinery and chemical products 
(Kim 1991: 6-9). For these reasons, the continuous decrease in the percentage 
of Korean textile exports to the USA beginning in the early 1970s is less likely 
to have been relevant to Korea’s behavior in the Vietnam War. 
 The export of South Korean textiles to the US displays an identical 
pattern with South Korea's decision to deploy troops in Vietnam and the size 
and nature of their armed forces. Korean’s decision to deploy troops allowed 
for considerable growth in the percentage of Korean textile exports to the 
United States. Therefore, the fact that South Korea was the highest contributor 
to the Vietnam War coalition affected the trade relationship with the United 
States in textiles and apparel. 
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There was little exchange between Taiwan and the US regarding textile trade. 
However, it is worth scrutinizing documents that were written by US foreign 
policymakers on December 8th 1969. In December 1969, Spiro Agnew, the 
Vice President of the United States was given the opportunity for a discussion 
with President Chiang Kai-shek during his Asian tour. The document suggests 
some important agendas that President Chiang or other members of his 
government were expected to raise. Also, there are recommended answers to 
these expected agendas that were prepared for Vice President Agnew.  The 
document includes various topics such as U.S. initiatives toward Communist 
China, U.S. military assistance to Taiwan’s air defense, or the continued U.S. 
defense commitment to Taiwan, including textile negotiations between Taiwan 
and the United States.  
 According to the document, foreign policymakers of the United States 
already knew that “the Chinese [Taiwanese] will probably emphasize the 
importance of the textile industry and its continued growth to the economic 
health and growth of the Republic of China, and seek generous treatment from 
the US in the current negotiations”.39 Agnew was instructed to avoid entering 
into a technical discussion about textile issues if they were to bring up the 
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subject. In US manufacturing, the textile and apparel industry was the largest 
employer and gave jobs to relatively unskilled labor or members of 
disadvantaged groups.40 Thus, Agnew was briefed to decline any favor on 
textile negotiations by citing the high unemployment rate of the United States. 
This document shows that the United States had already predetermined a fixed 
response on textile issues regardless of Taiwan's demands.  
 The actual discussion between US Vice President Agnew and 
Taiwanese President Chiang was not recorded in the FRUS, so it is rather 
difficult to understand the details. However, the two action memorandums 
written after the meeting do not include any mention of favorable treatment on 
Taiwanese export issues. The memorandums suggest the proposed gestures to 
Taiwan as assurances of U.S. support. As a commitment, the U.S. government 
promised only to further support Taiwan’s technical agricultural assistance 
program 41  and to upgrade Taiwan’s air defense capability through the 
provision of military aircraft42. Neither of the memorandums includes the 
United States’ specific commitment to Taiwan on textile issues. Instead, Vice 
President Agnew planned to ask Taiwan to establish quota controls on man-
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made fiber and wool textile products exported to the United States in the 
meeting with President Chiang. Taiwan’s request for generous deals on textile 
quotas was not accepted. It is important to note that Vice President Agnew 
reminded the Taiwanese government that “the recipient country was not in a 
position to make a decision as to precisely what type of material the US would 
provide”. 43  
 Figure 6 shows that the percentage of Taiwan’s textile exports to the 
United States slightly increased during the Vietnam War period, especially 
between 1963 to the early 1970s when the U.S. started to gradually withdraw 
its soldiers. Taiwan’s graph is in stark contrast to that of South Korea which 
represents a steep increase as their contribution to the coalition expands. Even 
though Taiwan participated in the Vietnam War coalition and offered rear 
support to U.S. forces and foreign troops, its contribution did not lead to an 
export expansion in textile and apparel products as in the case of South Korea. 
Foreign policymakers of the United States knew that for Taiwan, it was critical 
to secure as many textile quotas as possible because the textile industry 
constituted one of Taiwan's largest manufacturing industries.44  
 However, it is not just that the United States gave minimal trade 
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benefits to Taiwan, but there are not many discussions on trade benefits as 
economic side-payments between Taiwan and the United States to begin with. 
This is because textile negotiations with Taiwan were part of a non-decision 
making process to the United States. Bachrach and Baratz (1962; 1963) define 
that non-decision making is to prevent certain issues from developing into the 
actual decision making process which carefully considers plans of actions and 
makes the decision. The dynamics of non-decision making does not necessarily 
require actual disagreement in preferences among foreign policymakers. 
Instead, there is a possibility that they were not interested in the issues and 
decide not to participate in the decision making process. Thus, nondecision is 
an academically important concept and it is subject to observation and analysis 
though it is barely observable (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 641). From the 
concept of non-decision making process, it can be assumed that US foreign 
policymakers were intuitively indifferent to Taiwan’s textile issues, limiting 
actual decision making to non-controversial matters.  
 One interesting point in Figure 6 is that Taiwan’s overall percentages 
of textile exports to the United States started to grow after 1970. Although 
observations of Taiwanese textile trade flows for 1972 and 1973 are missing in 
the World Trade Flows dataset, it can be assumed that the amounts of textile 
exports of Taiwan to the United States expanded in the early 1970s and became 




flows from Taiwan to the United States in the early 1970s may have little to do 
with an impact of the Vietnam War, because the U.S’s request for coalition 
joining to its allies was most active in the early 1960s and the coalition started 
to disband as the U.S. withdrew its soldiers in 1970. Instead of preferential 
trade concessions from the United States in favor of Taiwan’s contribution in 
Vietnam, the increases in the percentage of textile exports seem to be associated 
with Taiwan’s rapid economic development in the 1970s, especially with the 
growth of light manufacturing enterprises. 
 
5.4 Findings and Discussions 
 South Korea and Taiwan responded differently to the United States’ 
request to help and support the military defense of South Vietnam. While the 
South Korean government sent the largest number of foreign troops to the 
Vietnam War coalition second only to the United States, the coalition leader, the 
Taiwanese government supported the coalition forces from the rear. Their 
different levels of contribution to the coalition had an impact on bilateral trade 
relationships with the United States.   
During the 1960s, the economic growth of both South Korea and 
Taiwan’s was largely based on export-oriented industrialization, and textiles 
were one of their leading exports. Governments of the two countries were 




for their contributions in the Vietnam War coalition. While textile negotiations 
between South Korea and the United States had been discussed continuously 
and produced favorable conditions to improve the Korean textile industry’s 
export performance, negotiations between Taiwan and the United States were 
processed as non-decision making agenda and treated as a marginal issue.  
The contrasting contributions of South Korea and Taiwan to the war 
coalition affected the trade relationship between them and the United States, the 
coalition leader. These opposite results between South Korea and Taiwan 
support the hypothesis, indicating that the coalition leader discriminates in 
favor of supportive and cooperative states in war coalitions by providing them 





Conclusion and Future Directions 
 
6.1 Key Findings 
Security studies have long been interested in illuminating the ties between 
economics and security. As a result of focusing on the security externality of 
military alliances, much of the literature thus far has been preoccupied with the 
difference in bilateral trade relationship between allies and non-allies. My 
argument differs from previous studies on the trade-security nexus in that this 
research has centered on how trade patterns change within the alliance 
according to their behavior. The research trend proposed here can be potentially 
more interesting when considering the fact that allies’ behaviors are highly 
unpredictable. It is difficult to assume that allies will always be cooperative and 
strongly committed to other ally partners. As such, there is somewhat of a 
difficulty in uniformly categorizing the varying behaviors of alliances as the 
previous research has centered on.  
In order to examine how trade changes according to different 
behaviors of its allies, this study observe the case of the Vietnam War coalition 
in which there were clearly varying behaviors amongst the alliances, and in 




findings through statistical methods and comparative case study suggest that 
different behavioral responses to the Vietnam War by the U.S.’s allies, as in the 
varying degrees of participation and levels of contribution, led to 
proportionately different changes in textile trade volume. Dynamic panel data 
analysis using system GMM shows that states with the highest level of 
contributions that send their military forces to the coalition earn higher trade 
benefits on textile flows from the coalition leader than do states with limited or 
no contributions.  
Next, I analyzed the textile trade negotiations between the U.S. and 
South Korea and between the U.S. and Taiwan. The highest contribution of the 
South Korean government to the Vietnam War coalition weighed in their own 
favor during the textile negotiation with the United States, which results in an 
increase in textile quotas in favor of sending military forces to South Vietnam. 
On the contrary, the limited efforts to the coalition forces of the Taiwanese 
government as a rear base did not raise their bargaining position in textile trade 
negotiation with the United States and their request for better deals on textile 
quotas were not accepted. The conclusion is that alliance behavior had a 
pronounced effect on import flows.  
 These findings suggest implications for both actors in the bilateral 
trade relationship. First, it allows for the importer as the coalition leader to 




contributions from its allies. The coalition leader prefers high levels of 
participation and contribution from allies in order to partially reduce the costs 
and to politically justify its decision to wage war. Based on this result, the 
coalition leader can promote participation and contribution in the future event 
by discriminately handing out trade benefits to potential participants. Therefore, 
this strategy aids the formation of the coalition and also builds coalition 
durability.  
 Moreover, the findings can serve as guidelines for behavior to alliance 
partners as well. Many studies have revealed that states join the war coalition in 
which they have little or no stake to pursue economic benefits. Yet, there is a lot 
of pressure for allies to participate in war coalitions. States may face strong 
public opposition, being accused of sacrificing their own soldiers as a means of 
foreign currency earning. Or, they have trouble sending troops simply due to 
their lack of military capabilities. Likewise, states have to shoulder tremendous 
physical constraints and cost. The findings of this study suggest that states can 
measure whether their decision for sending troops is well worth the effort and 
expense despite the cost. Especially, it can provide directions for those weak 






6.2 Future Directions 
In the future, this research can also be expanded. This study focuses on the 
Vietnam War under the special circumstances of the Cold War. However, it is 
reasonable to ask what this research concern would look like in a period other 
than the Cold War. War Coalitions in the post-Vietnam era are outside of the 
frame of ideological conflicts during the Cold War. Instead, the frame has taken 
various different forms such as humanitarian purposes, counterterrorism and 
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As such, there is not only the 
continuing participation and contribution by allies, but by non-allies as well due 
to the more inclusive and comprehensive nature of new global problems. Such 
actions by non-allies fall under the shaded area in group 4 from Figure 2. Thus, 
the key question is: with which priority does the U.S. provide trade benefits to 
the four groups? It is predictable that those states that are members of the 
alliance and also actively contribute most likely receive the most benefits, and 
those states that are not alliance nor contribute to the coalition experience little 
change or a decrease in trade flows. However, it is difficult to intuitively 
answer the same question for groups 2 and 4. In this case, both the ally/non-ally 
status and the differences in state behavior must be comprehensively accounted 
for. Future research may further address this research question. 
 Also, future research can address whether there is a ‘paradox of 




the United States in favor of its notable commitments in the coalition while 
Taiwan received little to almost no support from the United States, even though 
the importance of textiles to these two countries’ economies and exports were 
both overwhelming. However, after the U.S. government started to withdraw 
troops from Vietnam, the amounts of Korean textile exports to the United States 
went through a rapid decline. On the contrary, the variation in Taiwan’s textile 
trade pattern began to increase even after the coalition disbanded and the war 
was over. This interesting disparity may imply that giving preferential trade 
benefits to the developing countries may not be helpful to their long-run 
economic growth. The Korean textile industries could expand as they received 
a big favor from the U.S. government during the Vietnam War, but they failed 
to keep up with the upward trend after the United States lost its great stake in 
Vietnam. It indicates that various types of positive trade benefits such as giving 
subsidies or lowering tariffs as a tool to secure more contributions and 
commitments from allies may raise the economic dependency of the recipients, 
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국제 무역을 설명함에 있어서 기존 연구들은 상대국이 동맹국인지 아닌
지의 여부에 주목해왔다. 적대국은 무역으로 인해 발생하게 되는 경제적 
혜택을 군사력을 증강시키는데 이용할 수 있는 반면, 동일한 조건에서 
동맹국의 국력 및 군사력 증강은 동맹 전체의 이익이 될 수 있기 때문이
다. 그러나 적-친구의 이분법적 구분에서 벗어날 경우 정치와 안보 요인
은 국제 무역 관계에 어떤 영향을 미칠까? 본 연구는 부정적인 무역안보
외부효과가 적용되지 않는 동맹 내부의 무역 관계에서는 ‘동맹’이라는 
상대적인 지위보다 동맹국이 무역 상대국에게 얼마나 협조적이었는가의 
여부가 더 중요한 영향을 미친다는 점을 지적한다.  
본 연구는 전쟁 연합에 주목해 동맹 내부의 무역 관계를 심층적
으로 다룬다. 전쟁 연합에서의 책임 분담은 국력 수준에 따라 다르게 배
분된다. 전쟁 연합에서 강대국에 비용 분담이 편향되어 나타나는 까닭은 
강대국이 해당 전쟁에 대해 많은 이권을 개입하고 있으며, 동시에 전쟁
에 참여할 수 있는 많은 역량을 보유하고 있기 때문이다. 반면, 전쟁의 
당사국이 아닌 국가들은 집단 공동의 이익을 달성하기 위해 자국의 희생
을 감수하려고 하지 않는다. 강대국을 제외한 다른 국가들은 집단행동에




그러나 일부 국가들은 전쟁 연합에 참여함으로써 연합군의 일원으로 참
여하지 않은 국가들과 서로 다른 행동 양상을 보인다. 또한 동일하게 전
쟁 연합의 참여를 결정하였더라도 국가들은 서로 다른 수준으로 연합에 
기여한다. 이처럼 동일 전쟁 내에서도 국가들의 참여 여부가 달라지며, 
참여를 결정한 국가들도 전쟁 연합에 제공하는 기여의 수준과 규모가 상
이하다는 점을 나타낸다. 전쟁 연합에 대한 국가들의 서로 다른 수준의 
기여도는 전쟁 연합을 주도하는 국가로부터 차별적인 무역 혜택을 야기
한다. 
보다 구체적으로 본 연구는 베트남전의 사례를 통해 동맹국들의 
차별적인 행동 양상과 미국과의 무역 관계 간에 어떠한 연관성이 있는지
를 분석한다. 당시 미국이 제공한 차별적인 무역 혜택으로는 1960년대에
서 1970년대 사이 미국 동맹국들의 대표적인 대미 수출품목 중 하나인 
섬유산업을 살펴보았다. 가설을 검증하기 위해 본 연구는 통계분석방법
론과 사례 연구를 접목시켰다. 우선, 동태적 패널 데이터 분석방법인 시
스템 일반화적률법을 이용해 베트남 전쟁 연합에 대한 동맹국들의 기여
도에 따라 그들이 미국으로부터 제공받는 섬유 수출량이 어떻게 변화해
나가는지를 살펴보았다. 심화적으로 본 연구는 당시 경제 성장 정도와 
국력 수준, 미국과의 군사적 관계, 그리고 섬유 산업이 당시 국가의 경제 




국과 대만을 비교하였다. 파병과 동맹국들의 기여도에 대한 논의가 활발
하게 진행되었던 기간 동안 한국과 미국, 그리고 대만과 미국 사이에 파
병에 대한 대가로서 섬유 산업 수출에 대한 무역의 혜택이 있었는지를 
살펴보았다. 
두 실증분석은 모두 전쟁 연합에 더 높은 수준으로 기여한 국가
일수록 전쟁 연합 주도국인 미국으로부터 더 많은 섬유 수출량과 섬유 
쿼터를 배정받았음을 나타낸다. 이러한 연구 결과는 국가가 단순히 동맹
-비동맹의 구분에 따라 무역 관계를 형성해나가는데 그치지 않고, 동맹
국의 행동 변화를 유도하고 이를 평가함에 있어 무역을 적극적인 외교정
책 수단으로 사용한다는 점을 밝힌다. 
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